The Role of the Court in Maintaining Separation of Powers
By Lee Lee Sharp ’28
The Trump Administration has pushed the American legal system to its limits and breached the social contract between citizen and government as dictated by the Constitution— all without serious push-back from the Supreme Court. Donald Trump appears to be uncontested by the American judicial system, a branch of government designed to limit his power in these exact circumstances. The Court has found ways to not only endorse President Trump’s agenda, but also to manipulate Constitutional interpretation so that it supports his actions. Two such cases demonstrate the erasure of the normal American Judicial system and the insurmountably significant role that the court can play in preserving American freedoms when it so chooses to intervene.
Trump v. United States (2024) questioned if a President can be prosecuted for crimes he committed during his time in office once he is no longer president. The Court ruled in a 6-3 decision for Trump, “A former U.S. President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority, at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts, and no immunity for unofficial acts.” (1) The case was decided on July 1, 2024, during the presidential election between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, before Biden ended his campaign. It also came in the wake of the January 6th insurrection. In light of the cultural circumstances at the time of the decision, the case can be read in two ways. First, if Donald Trump were to be elected president, he would not be able to prosecute Joe Biden for alleged crimes he committed during his presidency. The second is if Joe Biden were to be elected, the court had written an opinion so obscure that it still preserves the possibility of indicting Donald Trump for crimes he may have committed.
Even with this potential dual protection in mind, the result of Trump was essentially total immunity for President Trump due to the fact that what actions constitute as being in an official capacity is subjective. The Court claims that this immunity only extends to action which the president takes in an official capacity, but where is the limit? As Justice Sotomayor writes in her dissent, if the executive “orders the Navy’s SEAL Team 6 to assassinate a political rival? Immune. Organizes a military coup to hold onto power? Immune. Takes a bribe in exchange for a pardon? Immune. Immune. Immune. Immune.” (2) This case is an example of a moment when the Supreme Court had the power to put a check on the President’s power and instead chose to extend it.
Chief Roberts’ main defense for the Court’s ruling was the claim that, in order for the president to be able to perform his duties in a bold and energetic manner, it is essential that he is not hindered by the fear of eventually being prosecuted for the action he may have to take. (3) The idea of a president that is painted in the majority's decision is not only detrimental to the United State’s democratic processes but also dangerously elevates the president to the realm of a tyrant like figure, unbound by the constraints to which every other American is socially contracted. How can there be a separation of powers when the executive can take virtually any action with no consideration for moral or judicial repercussions? This case is one of many that demonstrate the United State’s spiral into a “dark time,” to use Hannah Arendt’s language. (4)
Newsom v. Trump (2025) demonstrates the intervention that a court can take in order to hinder the abuse of presidential power. After protests in Los Angeles over federal immigration raids, President Trump deployed the California National Guard to quell the protests. California governor Gavin Newsom sued, claiming it was an unlawful federal takeover of state military forces. (5) District Court Judge Charles Breyer ruled that the Trump administration had violated the Posse Comitatus Act, which limits the use of federal military personnel for domestic law enforcement. He then issued an injunction to block the California National Guard from policing civilians in California. The Trump administration was then able to secure a stay from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which allowed the administration to keep the troops in California temporarily while the case proceeded. (6) In December of 2025, after the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the State of Illinois in a similar case, the Trump administration officially withdrew their appeal in the Ninth Court. (7) On December 10, Breyer ordered the California National Guard deployment to end, which was upheld by the Ninth Circuit court, ordering them to leave by December 15.
The Ninth Circuit Court’s decision to grant the Trump Administration a stay demonstrates the clear ways the court can limit federal executed power as is demonstrated in Newsom v. Trump, however, the Supreme Court chose not to impose this limitation in Trump v. U.S. In response to Breyer’s claim that there is a standard which courts must enforce against the president, the district court retorted that they are interpreting the historical precedent of giving deference to the presidential administration. But should the district court operate as it would under previous administrations? (8) In deciding not to limit executive power in Trump V. U.S., the judicial branch is enabling the executive’s encroachment on the rights of the American people. The judicial branch both has the ability and the duty to fight Trump’s overreach, however, they have ultimately failed to do so and therefore, failed their duty to the American people.
Endnotes
(1) Oyez, “Trump V. United States, Oyez, 2024 https://www.oyez.org/cases/2023/23-939
(2) Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593, 683, 691 (2024) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
(3) Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593, 613-614 (2024)
(4) Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), viii-ix.
(5) Complaint at 1-3, Newsom v. Trump, No. 25-cv-03727 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2025)
(6) Newsom v. Trump, 141 F.4th 1032, 1040 (9th Cir. 2025).
(7) Trump v. Illinois, 606 U.S. ___ (2025); see also Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Appeal, Newsom v. Trump, No. 25-1432 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 2025).
(8) Newsom v. Trump, 141 F.4th 1032, 1049 (9th Cir. 2025)